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a s e c u l a r a g e *
P e o p l e t e n d t o t h i n k of secularism as the absence of
religion, not something in itself. Or they think of it simply as a strong
separation of church and state – creating again, a zone of absence. These
two views are at the core of the standard sociological story of secu-
larization. This is understood in some combination as the decline of
religion and/or the compartmentalization of religion in its own private
sphere so that it is excluded from public life and indeed markets.
This perspective misses much. Charles Taylor’s remarkable (but
somewhat unwieldy) new book, A Secular Age, is perhaps the single
most important resource for trying to develop a better understanding.
But it should be read together with other texts, for enormous as it is, it
does not cover everything. In particular, it is a philosopher’s account,
so it does much better analyzing the writings of intellectual elites than
broader popular culture or social structure (though it does have
interesting and innovative things to say about each). It is also an
account of secularism in Latin Christendom and its successor societies,
especially Europe and North America. The issue here is not just that it
doesn’t deal with the rest of the world, but that it doesn’t very strongly
engage the impact of colonialism and other links to the rest of the world
on Europe and America. Surprisingly, it doesn’t draw on Talal Asad’s
deeply interesting exploration of Formations of the Secular, even though
it partially overlaps its terrain in considering transformations of sub-
jectivity. Asad’s work and that of other anthropologists such as Saba
Mahmood remains an important complement to Taylor’s project.
Taylor begins by distinguishing three different senses of the secular.
I’ve mentioned the first two already, the exclusion of religion from
public spaces and the decline of religion. He has useful things to say
about each of these. Most importantly, I think, he criticizes what he
calls ‘‘subtraction stories’’. These are accounts in which authors trace
the decline or compartmentalization of religion without seriously
considering the transformations this entails – not just in religion but
in everything else as well. Some of the best parts of Taylor’s book are
lengthy discussions of the ways in which ideas of personhood and
subjectivity, social relations and moral obligations, material well-being
and economic pursuits have been changed by both (a) changes in the
* About Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,
2007).
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ways in which religion shapes each and (b) reductions in the extent to
which religion shapes each.
But the most searching and original – but also unsettled and un-
settling – parts of Taylor’s book concern what he calls ‘‘Secularism 3’’.
This focuses on ‘‘a move from a society where belief in God is
unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is un-
derstood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest
to embrace’’ (p. 3). Secularism is not just a net reduction in religious
belief or practice, therefore, but a change in the very conditions of
belief. Taylor is clear that in many ways secularism makes belief harder,
but he doesn’t see only negatives on the balance sheet. Secularism has
come about alongside changes that we should value, like a deeper
notion of self and subjective agency and a more egalitarian social order.
Moreover, though belief may be problematic in new ways, it is also
possible for it to be meaningful in new ways.
Taylor really means belief. He doesn’t want to see religion as just
a number of engaging practices or quasi-ethnic customs. It turns
centrally on belief in God or at least something larger and perhaps
better than mere this-worldly human flourishing that defines religious
faith. But Taylor steers clear of some of the common complaints
against a belief-centered account of religion. He does not mean belief
in specific doctrines. Nor does he understand belief as an abstract
intellectual commitment to the truth of a propositional statement.
Rather, he devotes considerable effort to showing how that sort of
narrowed ‘‘epistemological’’ approach is part of a package of cultural
and intellectual changes that make religious belief hard, even while
they make for advances in other domains like science.
The epistemological approach turns on a strong separation of the
knowing mind from culture, social relations, even body and perhaps
‘‘spirit’’ – that is, aspects of our mental activity not readily rendered in
rational-propositional terms. Taylor joins with those who have argued
for the importance of other forms and dimensions of understanding, of
tacit knowledge, and of the embeddedness of each of us in language and
culture. We are only able to engage in the kind of disembodied reason
moderns value against a background of understandings we often don’t
recognize. Among these are some commitments that are deeper than
others, more fundamentally shaping of our thought and outlooks. Here
Taylor builds on his argument from Sources of the Self, where he called
these ‘‘hypergoods’’. We are all committed to such higher goods,
Taylor suggests, even those who claim not to be (reflecting their
commitment to ‘‘objectivity’’ and perhaps ‘‘rationality’’ as principles
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more fundamental than some others). It is not only the religious who
have some ‘‘beliefs’’ beyond the conclusions of ordinary reason, indeed
orienting for that reason.
So one move for Taylor is trying to change the way we think about
belief. Taylor starts out by evoking a subjective experience, what he
calls ‘‘fullness’’. It is an experience of life and the world as imbued with
meaning, beauty, and connection. Crucially, it is a subjective experi-
ence in which the fullness is understood to be objective – the way the
world is, or at least can sometimes be – not merely a result of subjective
attitude. Our subjective stances may afford us more or better access to
fullness, but it is not merely an interior state. Indeed, it is a reflection
of our individualistic, psychological orientation and also our rational-
istic epistemological criteria for knowledge that try to grasp fullness
entirely in terms of subjective states; we say we have moments of
transcendent experience, thus, rather than moments when we experi-
ence transcendent character of reality.
Fullness is not in itself a belief, it is the sense of something larger or
more deeply meaningful about which we may have beliefs. Nor is the
sense of fullness derived only from a perception of reality and meaning
beyond this world or only interpretable in religious terms. This sense
of heightened meaning and connection is always possible within
humanist and naturalist frames of reference. But to most moderns,
this strong sense of the fullness of the world, of the wonder of it that
goes beyond everyday concerns about health, material prosperity,
politics, even justice, is only available occasionally. Some people may
seem to have more consistent access to it and this may be a source of
their inspirational leadership, extraordinary commitments, or saintli-
ness. But it is typically episodic, available only for moments, perhaps
aided by ritual but sometimes just surprising us. And fullness is less
available now than it used to be when it seemed routinely the case that
the material world was not all that there was.
Here there is an interesting twist to Taylor’s argument, for he
thinks this isn’t all bad. Fullness is harder to achieve but it can be
wonderful in new ways. If we can work through the various obstacles to
having a sense of living amid transcendence, we can experience it in
richer ways. Here Taylor’s argument is loosely Hegelian (not surpris-
ingly since he is one of the greatest interpreters and analysts of Hegel).
We start out with easy access to a sense of fullness, but don’t know very
well what we have. We grow in knowledge (or as Rousseau would say,
in arts and science), but in ways that cut us off from full relationships
to nature, our own lives, other people, and God. Yet there is potential
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for returning to a sense of fullness informed by poetry and philosophy
as well as religion.
Making the idea – and experience – of transcendence sensible is one
of Taylor’s central goals. Acknowledging that religion can be defined in
a variety of ways, his interest in it is defined by this – or rather by the
relationship between ‘‘immanence’’ and ‘‘transcendence’’. And as
importance as transcendence is, most of his book is devoted to trying
to understand immanence. Taylor sees the modern West as shaped
deeply by the idea of a natural order understandable without reference
to anything outside itself (unless perhaps human consciousness is
understood this way, though as Taylor notes, it is often understood as
one more natural phenomenon). Indeed, he suggests that this is ‘‘the
great invention of the West’’ (p. 15). It is constitutive for an ‘‘immanent
frame’’ within which one can set aside questions of divine creation,
marking off a sharp boundary with the transcendent. The orderliness
of the world is now impersonal, perhaps set in motion by a watch-
maker-God, but working of itself.
A central historical phase in the movement towards this modern
understanding of self and others in the world is the late 17th and 18th
century spread of Providential Deism. Taylor offers a brilliant account
of the way in which this paved the way for exclusive humanism even
though its protagonists did not understand themselves as leaving the
realm of religion, and indeed understood themselves as solving prob-
lems within existing Christianity. A secular perspective grew within
religion before it was taken up by the irreligious. This was already
evident in Augustine, of course, but it took on new dimensions in the
early modern era. Growing secularism meant at first a greater religious
engagement with human relationships and other affairs of ‘‘this
world’’. It responded to a new affirmation of the virtues of ordinary
life, including not least the happiness and this-worldly nurturance of
family life. It responded to a new sense of historical time, anchored
partly in the self-consciousness of early moderns as inhabiting a new
era in which older forms of religion might no longer suffice. But
growing secularism also meant the understanding that ‘‘this world’’
moved according to an impersonal order of causes and effects within it.
And this helped to underwrite the rise of modern science. Though at
first this meant reading the word of God in nature rather than ancient
texts, it often became disengaged from religious connections to the idea
of a larger, transcendent whole.
By the transcendent, Taylor generally means sources of meaning
which lie beyond this world – at least as we can grasp it in either
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anthropocentric-humanistic or naturalistic terms. Taylor articulates
three dimensions in which we go ‘‘beyond’’: a good higher than human
flourishing (such as love in the sense of agape), a higher power (such as
God), and extension of life (or even ‘‘our lives’’) beyond the ‘‘natural’’
scope between birth and death (summarized on p. 20).
Taylor indicates that the God of Abraham who orients his faith is
only one way to grasp this transcendent reality. He is open, thus, to the
potentially equal value of grasping the transcendent in Hindu and
Muslim terms (and he may mean to include Muslims when he makes
reference to believing in the God of Abraham). He is open to new
theologies that transform the meaning of the term God, trying to rid it
of anthropocentric, or patriarchal projections (though in fact theology
as such doesn’t figure very strongly among the many intellectual
sources Taylor engages in A Secular Age). But Taylor’s usage seems
consistently focused on that which is beyond nature by virtue of the
actual contemporary existence of some other or additional reality. But
when we ask of the world as it exists ‘‘is that all there is’’ we are also
asking about the future. Indeed, part of what Taylor sees as limiting in
the immanent frame is the tendency towards both deterministic and
instrumental approaches to human life: we are led to accept too much
of what exists as the fixed character of reality, and then adapt ourselves
to it.
In any case, the immanent frame is basic to secularism as we know
it. We cannot make sense of the decline of religious practice (where this
has occurred), the compartmentalization of religion as private, or even
declarations of doctrinaire atheism without it. The very term ‘‘super-
natural’’ expresses something of a point. The natural is the unmarked
category and there is a sharp division from that which is outside or
above it. And ironically, it is in significant part religious leaders who
promoted this immanent frame and its sharp boundary. They did so in
order to ‘‘clean up’’ the inherited beliefs and practices of pre-Christian
folk religion and focus believers’ attention in a proper way on God.
They sought to purge it of the magical and festive. Early modern
clerical elites – notably in the era of the Reformation but on both
Catholic and Protestant sides – sought to enforce among parishioners
broadly standards of piety and orthodoxy previously only deemed
important for elites. In doing so, they came to define the phenomenon
of belief in a new and sharp enough way to make declarations of
explicit unbelief – atheism – far more prominent than in earlier times
(when people might have shown little interest in religion, dissented
from specific teachings, or deviated from orthodox practices without
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asserting an epistemic denial of God). These early modern religious
elites helped set in motion a continuing purification of thought which
would eventually take an anti-religious turn in the Enlightenment. But
it starts out with an effort to get people to be better Christians.
The disciplinary revolution familiar to sociologists as part of
a Weberian account of the rise of capitalism is also a central part of
this story of religious transformation. ‘‘Training in a disciplined, sober,
industrious life’’ helped to shape both the instrumental character of
modern secular society and its productivity. But it also helped to
produce the very sense that society and self could both be remade. It
was thus an ‘‘experience on the part of elites of success in imposing the
order they sought on themselves and society’’ (p. 228). Moreover, the
disciplinary revolution coincided with the civilizing process (Taylor
draws on Elias) to create new kinds of sensitivities and values within
secular culture. If this became less violent, though, it also became
oriented in new ways to a rule-governed approach to morality.
Taylor traces the growth not just of ‘‘secularism’’ in the abstract but
even more of a secular culture with specific content. The rise of
exclusive humanism, for example, involved the notion that human
flourishing defines the comprehensive good towards which human
beings should be oriented. It was thus secular and limited. But it was
also the source of tremendous advances in care for fellow human
beings. Taylor would challenge the limitation of the good to human
flourishing, but not reject the advances that humanism brought.
Likewise, secular culture grew with thinking about society in terms
of new social imaginaries like market, democracy, and public sphere.
Each was shaped by humanism, but also by notions like the equality of
human individuals aggregated in one way or another in an impersonal
order. The kind of simplistic opposition of religion to ‘‘secular
humanism’’ drawn today by some religious leaders is thus very
misleading according to Taylor. Not only would it be unfortunate to
jettison the goal of human flourishing. It would impoverish rather than
improve religion to try to cleanse it of engagement in the secular world.
Here we return to the story of Reform (Catholic as well as
Protestant) as it helped create the secular age. Initially, Reform was
a project of producing purer religion, and demanding more widespread
lay adherence to high (even monastic) standards of purity. The effort to
‘‘cleanse’’ Christianity of folk beliefs and practices is one part of this
story. So was the rise of new morality governed by self-discipline but
also ever-proliferating rules, the religious counterpart to the manners
prized in the civilizing process. The Reform effort also helped shape
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the rise of an understanding of an impersonal natural order into which
God intervened less frequently (if ever) and which could be the object
of a purely natural science. It shaped equally a transformation of the
self to create individual subjects – ‘‘buffered selves’’ – able to take
a distanced view of everything outside the mind. This meant not only
ceasing to understand the self as ‘‘porous’’ such that demons or God
could enter it but also gaining ability to act instrumentally in relation to
the external world and to one’s own body. Reformers created a sharper
division between the spiritual and the physical.
The rise of a secular age obviously transformed attention to the
temporal, material world. But it also transformed the spiritual. It
brought about what Taylor calls the ‘‘excarnation’’, the development
of the notion that the spirit was radically other to and potentially
contrary to the body. We see this in the epistemological attitude, ‘‘the
exaltation of disengaged reason as the royal road to knowledge, even in
human affairs’’ (p. 746). It appeared also in theology, devotions, and
morality. Rather than pursuing the ‘‘enfleshment of God’’ (p. 739)
Taylor sees the dominant versions of modern Christianity seeking
distance from the flesh. This left a large field open – initially to
innovations within a Christian frame and then with movement outside
it. Starting with deism, thus, there was new attention to ‘‘the body,
history, the place of individuals, contingency, and the emotions. That
is, it integrated these as essential dimensions of our understanding of
human life, but it excluded them altogether from our relation to God’’
(p. 288). In this Taylor sees a distancing from core Christian teachings
centered on the Incarnation of God in man.
It is not slighting this huge book to say that it won’t be the last
word. It has its own internal tensions, incompletenesses, and openings
to divergent interpretations. It is a less completely crafted whole than
Taylor’s other books; it takes a number of side-tracks, and sometimes it
doubles back on itself. It is also full of rich and fascinating explorations
in pursuit of both empirical understanding of our history and present
and better orientation to the normative issues in future choices.
c r a i g c a l h o u n
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